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By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail.
Benjamin Franklin
Much has already been written about the failures in Iraq, and there is no question that much more will be written. All are seeking to understand the unbelievable turnaround from the relative euphoria after the rapid fall of Saddam to the gloom of the quagmire of roadside bombings and mounting death tolls. That we failed to fully capitalize on the military success is without question-what we seek to understand is why?
Was the effort doomed from the start? Most think not and offer a variety of reasons for the failure including doctrine, training, force structure, military/civilian coordination, or the obvious intelligence failure. One author neatly captured what nearly all think about the situation in Iraq following combat operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), -It never had to be this bad.‖ 1 If we really hope to avoid the same scenario in the future we must understand the issues that led to the failure. This paper will explore the U.S. failure to succeed in the post-hostilities phase (Phase IV) in Iraq by focusing on the military leadership at the operational level during planning for Phase IV. By looking at two of our most recent failures at post-hostility operations, we unfortunately see that some lessons have not been learned…or even relearned. In both the post-hostility operations in Panama after Operation JUST CAUSE and in Iraq as part of OIF, the combatant commanders made the same fundamental errors. But again we are left with -why?‖ How did experienced military officers at the end of long and distinguished careers let the situations get so far out of control? The fundamental problem in both cases was the combatant commander. Due to poor decisions to separate combat planning from post-combat planning and near zealous desire for secrecy, plans for Phase IV were never really completed and the limited planning that was accomplished did not result in anything actually executable. In addition, the change of combatant commanders immediately before the decisive combat operations phase (Phase III) in JUST CAUSE and just after in OIF only served to exacerbate an already complex and difficult planning arena. To be fair, both combatant commanders did win their wars as the -warfighter‖ must, but by failing to effectively plan for Phase IV their lasting legacy is not nearly so bright.
What we will see is that combatant commander leadership is THE critical factor in ensuring robust, operational planning is done for post-hostilities (Phase IV).
This paper will dissect the operational failure to produce a plan for Phase IV in Panama and Iraq by first studying the planning efforts for Operations JUST CAUSE and IRAQI FREEDOM. With an overview of the basic flow of planning for the operations one can see the interaction of Phase III and Phase IV planning and the influences on the failure to produce viable plans for Phase IV. This examination of flawed planning is followed by a consideration of the combatant commanders' role in the flawed plan. The factors of time, space and force vary greatly across these two operations, but the operational leaders' failure to plan for Phase IV is one constant. Recommendations for avoiding similar failures in the future flow from this analysis.
PLANNING FOR PANAMA
The road to JUST CAUSE can be traced back to the death of Panamanian dictator planning capacity but also his own belief that his staff and that of his components were incapable of accomplishing the job. 13 His focus on BLIND LOGIC, the post-hostilities plan, was nowhere near as clear and he would characterize this as the greatest mistake of his military career. Kelly, decided BLIND LOGIC would also be a poor name for the post-hostility operations in Panama and chose Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY as more befitting the skill and purpose required. 15 The result of incomplete planning, limited coordination due to excessive secrecy, poor command and control arrangements, limited force structure and a host of problematic assumptions was not surprising. Looting broke out immediately following the invasion and while damage was extensive, perhaps more importantly, over 200 civilians were killed in the effort to capture Noriega. 16 The removal of Noriega was relatively easy compared to running an entire country with limited democratic history, corrupt government officials at all levels, a depleted treasury, and rundown infrastructure. The United States was eventually able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, but not due to the -BLIND LOGIC‖ resulting after two years of planning. CENTCOM had already conducted wargames at least five times on their plans for combat, none focused on post-hostilities. 20 In July CENTCOM would, however, also get the unwelcome news that they were going to be responsible for planning Phase IV. 21 Exhausted after planning two iterations of the plan for Iraq and the invasion in Afghanistan, the CENTCOM staff set about a half-hearted effort to plan for Phase IV. Even in August 2002, General Franks was still telling his staff that State would lead the planning effort. 22 As the months passed, the Joint Staff became concerned with the lack of Phase IV planning and began to take matters into their own hands. 23 The JCS Chairman, General Richard Myers, directed his staff to begin planning a military organization that would secure post-war Iraq. They Iraq. These shortfalls would eventually be recognized and addressed, but the delays would be costly.
PLANNING FOR IRAQ

The Secret of Our SuccessFailure
According to Joint Publication 3-13.3, Operations Security, -The ultimate goal of OPSEC is increased mission effectiveness.‖ 30 The combatant commanders planning JUST CAUSE and OIF were so focused on OPSEC that they failed to identify the increased risk to their mission effectiveness. The situation in Panama clearly called for an incredibly high awareness of the impact leaks during planning could have had on the situation. Planning for the invasion of a country while you are a guest of that country is certainly sensitive.
In order to start the Phase IV planning, SOUTHCOM had to recruit Civil Affairs planners from the 361 st Civil Affairs Battalion. This was due to the fact that the four SCJ-5 Civil Affairs (CA) planners had little actual CA experience and none of them had Top Secret clearances. 31 These temporary planners were brought in on month-long rotations to work at a completely separate location from those planning combat operations. As these small teams of planners finished their month of planning, they would be -read out‖ of the plan which meant they could not discuss updates they had made with other planners back at their brigade headquarters. 32 The desire to ensure there were no leaks of the ELABORATE MAZE series of plans also meant no reporters in Washington D.C. 36 The loss of two laptops in August 2002 was another blow to the security environment. The laptops were eventually found and an Air Force sergeant was convicted in a court martial. 37 The compartmented and highly-charged environment made planning more difficult. Planning teams, if fact, didn't even know the plan by the same name to minimize leaks. 38 This was undoubtedly devised to help trace leaks when they occurred as well.
Operations security is clearly of great importance to every commander, but these combatant commanders placed such emphasis on OPSEC that their staffs' ability to plan was compromised. When an extreme focus on security is paired with a bifurcated planning staff it nearly impossible for the staffs to coordinate their activities. The result in these two operations was a poorly developed and uncoordinated post-hostilities plan.
Changing Horses in Mid-Stream
Once again we see tremendous similarities at the operational command level in JUST CAUSE and OIF. Leaders always retain the ability to choose their subordinates, but the impact to the operations in these cases was a major factor in the failures in Phase IV. In Panama, General Woerner had a tremendous amount of experience in not only the region but the country itself. General Woerner began his tour as commander of SOUTHCOM in 1987 and had already been asked to extend his tour an additional year beyond the normal two-year tour. Fluent in Spanish, General Woerner had traveled and lived extensively in the AOR throughout his career and had served as a brigade commander in Panama. 39 This experience led him to downplay either the need or probability of an invasion. He conducted the planning as directed by the JCS Planning Order, but viewed it as more of -a training experience‖ for his staff. 40 His criticism of a lack of a comprehensive strategy for Panama and the region before the House Appropriations defense subcommittee and in a speech to the American Chambers of Congress in early 1989
helped seal his fate. since it is so hard to plan for Phase IV? The combatant commander will continue for the foreseeable future to have the ability to lead planning for Phase IV since no other agency currently has the capacity. It is not as simple, however, as just identifying a group of planners to focus on Phase IV as was done in both JUST CAUSE and IRAQI FREEDOM. In both operations, a separate group of planners was directed to develop a Phase IV plan in relative isolation from the planning for Phase III. The combatant commanders also focused their energy and attention on the -war‖ and put their -A-Team‖ on their priority. The result was that we won the war, but lost the after war.
There is no easy prescription in doctrine for bifurcation malady. In fact, planners for Phase III and Phase IV will almost certainly be separate groups since their plans are complex and, though related, quite different. The combatant commander must focus his energy equally on both phases. What are the warning signs that bifurcation has crept into your planning process and is destroying the ability to succeed in the after war? You wargame Phase III and do not wargame Phase IV. The combatant commander gets a steady stream of briefings on Phase III with no like briefings on Phase IV. Planners from Phase III and Phase IV do not meet constantly to discuss how their plans interact. This list is by no means complete, but outlines some symptoms of illness that will cripple Phase IV before the war even begins. planning circles, but also allows sufficient interagency coordination to plan for Phase IV. This must be exercised on a regular basis to ensure the capability is more than just a concept.
Changing Horses in Mid-Stream-Unity of command is a fundamental principle of war, and over time our joint doctrine has evolved to the point where a single combatant commander is responsible for the campaign. Unity of command can also be damaged by changing the single commander invested with the authority to plan. There is always the possibility that a change will have to be made either due to a loss in confidence or even reasons such as health or another overriding leadership concern. What must be recognized, however, is the danger to Phase IV planning. General MacArthur not only fought and won the war in the Pacific during World War II, he also stayed on for years afterward to ensure the success of Phase IV in Japan. Our combatant commanders are on two-year contracts with an option to extend. The geographic combatant commanders command vast regions encompassing extremely complex issues. Is two years enough to have any hope of establishing the relations and the deep level of understanding necessary to succeed in war and the after-war? The continuity a longer stay in the geographic combatant command posts would bring would more than offset the hampering of upward mobility in the general officer ranks. There are just a handful of these positions and given the constant changes in the world today, this one simple change is a prudent move.
CONCLUSION
Planning for war is an incredibly complex and difficult activity. Our -warfighters‖ as the combatant commanders are often called, have done an extremely effective job of directing the planning efforts for combat. Our failures to effectively plan for the after combat, or Phase IV, in both Panama and Iraq can be traced at the operational level to the combatant commanders. In both cases their decisions to bifurcate the planning for Phase III and Phase IV and their extreme focus on OPSEC led to poorly developed plans for Phase IV which then led to failures in the initial Phase IV efforts. Changing combatant commanders either immediately before or after combat ops also exacerbated the tendency to focus on Phase III planning at the expense of Phase IV. The military must look to the warning signs of poor Phase IV planning such as bifurcated planning staffs, extreme OPSEC focus which inhibits staff communication and coordination, and a change of command immediately before or after combat operations. These warning signs were evident during the planning efforts in Panama and Iraq and if history is any guide, they will be seen again.
